How Should We Deal With  Black Swan  Surgeons in Spine Surgery? by Chapman, Jens R et al.
Providence St. Joseph Health
Providence St. Joseph Health Digital Commons
Articles, Abstracts, and Reports
6-1-2019
How Should We Deal With "Black Swan" Surgeons
in Spine Surgery?
Jens R Chapman
Swedish Neuroscience Institute
Jeffrey C Wang
Karsten Wiechert
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.psjhealth.org/publications
Part of the Neurology Commons, and the Surgery Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Providence St. Joseph Health Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles,
Abstracts, and Reports by an authorized administrator of Providence St. Joseph Health Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@providence.org.
Recommended Citation
Chapman, Jens R; Wang, Jeffrey C; and Wiechert, Karsten, "How Should We Deal With "Black Swan" Surgeons in Spine Surgery?"
(2019). Articles, Abstracts, and Reports. 1784.
https://digitalcommons.psjhealth.org/publications/1784
Editorial
How Should We Deal With “Black Swan”
Surgeons in Spine Surgery?
The term Black Swan was popularized by Nasim Nicholas
Talib in his eponymous 2007 bestseller and refers to the occur-
rence of highly improbable events in everyday life that were
previously felt to be impossible to happen, and create havoc
when they do arise.1 The metaphor arose out of the historic
belief that all swans featured a mandatorily white plume until
Dutch explorers under command of William de Vlamingh
encountered the previous unthinkable—black swans—in
Australia in 1697.2
In medicine, the thought that a person would enter the pro-
fession not motivated by the inspiration to be allowed to help
fellow humans seems simply inconceivable. Outliers in the
field of patient care who are primarily guided by profit or
research motives are fortunately relatively rare and usually
identifiable, albeit usually with some delay. Beyond that, the
thought that a practitioner could intentionally or recklessly
harm patients, either through continued wanton careless or
even more perturbing, malicious intent, seems simply unthink-
able—a classic “Black Swan” scenario. The historic safeguards
put in place to select medical practitioners anywhere are sub-
stantial and formidable—only top candidates are selected from
recognized institutions of higher learning, followed by a
lengthy and vigorous testing and advancement process
throughout medical school, followed by supervised incremen-
tally increased practical patient care exposures through intern-
ship, residency and finally fellowship and eventual practice
selection. Constant in-depth interactions with patients, peers,
professors, and the medical community and societies at large
over 10 to 15 years of a typical surgeon’s training would seem
to provide a strong protection against psychosocial outcasts
becoming accredited practitioners. Moreover, a near suffoca-
tive incessant bureaucracy with its strict credentialing and pro-
fessional review stipulations, as well as the constant threat of
medicolegal scrutiny, would seem to provide ultimate failsafe
reassurance for the safety of the public to be able to trust their
doctor.
Sadly, the recent story of Dr Christopher Duntsch, a practi-
cing neurosurgical spine surgeon from Dallas, Texas, tells us
otherwise and constitutes a true “Black Swan” event in our
specialty. This surgeon, who has been nicknamed “Dr Death”
or “Dr D” in many of the media stories that have emerged since
then, has shown us vividly that all of these selection processes
and regulatory checks may fail to protect patients from a reck-
less, incompetent, disabled, and/or psychiatrically deranged
practitioner. Many questions of how the administrative system
and the medical community could have allowed this to happen
have been raised since this horrific story has become a hit
podcast by the journalist Laura Beil,3 and has also been fea-
tured in numerous print periodicals.4-6 To date, our spine com-
munity has yet to deal with some of the professional questions
raised.
From an educational perspective, the incredible claim has
been made in courts and media that Dr Duntsch seems to have
been part of less than 100 documented cases throughout his
entire neurosurgical residency and spine fellowship, both done
at a premier US institutions staffed by highly respected senior
faculty.3-6 Questions have been raised that by being enrolled in
a combined MD/PhD program this practitioner was too dis-
tracted to concentrate sufficiently on his clinical work due to
the reported success of his basic research projects. The pur-
ported low number of cases seems to be implausible since most
North American residencies in Orthopaedics and Neurological
Surgery usually report several hundred cases per trainee annu-
ally throughout their 5 to 8 years of training.
From a practitioner standpoint, questions have been raised
how potential substance abuse was handled during training and
later as practitioner. These are very complex questions with
many implications that exceed the space for this editorial by
far, but on a pragmatic basis the fair question is how a trainee
absent for medical reasons can be expected to “make up” for
missed training time in the highly structured format of resi-
dency programs in most countries and how return to work is
monitored for a surgeon beyond testing for substance abuse and
some counseling.
As to the concerns about the quality of care rendered by Dr
Duntsch, the reported morbidity and mortality rates seem to
have been extraordinarily high given the relatively routine
sounding cases in a community-based practice.3,5 Eventually,
complications and poor outcomes caught up with Dr Duntsch,
as he was driven out of several hospitals in the relatively short
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time period of 4 years due to care concerns. Interestingly, it
were not peer spine surgeons who recognized and reported
concerns his care, but it was due to the determination and
persistence of 2 General Surgeons, Drs Randall Kirby and
Robert Henderson, who frequently perform exposures for spine
surgeons, that the ongoing misconduct of care was called out
and finally halted. It is difficult to estimate what would have
happened had these 2 surgeons not personally persisted after all
official organizational structures, including the hospitals and
Texas State Board failed to respond to concerns. In the end, Dr
Duntsch now holds the dubious distinction of being the first US
surgeon who was criminally prosecuted and convicted for his
poor clinical care to a sentence of life in prison, pending
another appeal.3,7
We all hope that a case like that of Dr Duntsch will remain a
singular exception. Of course, our patients and society at large
deserve to know that there is a sound accreditation and super-
vision system in place to protect vulnerable patients from
potentially dangerous practitioners. What are the lessons that
we as spine surgeons and practitioners can glean from this
highly unfortunate story and the patients affected by this?
On the educational side, there is the reassurance that both
Orthopaedic and Neurological Surgery training programs in
North America have implemented more sophisticated reporting
structures in terms of case numbers and types performed and
moreover documenting progress in surgical decision making
and actual technical proficiency of trainees through their
respective recently introduced milestones programs. By track-
ing progression of trainees in a far more detailed and differ-
entiated fashion, underperforming outliers can be identified
much more readily and corrective actions would hopefully be
taken in the future. Needless to say, this type of monitoring
program will be all the more important as the undeniable ill-
effects of work hour restrictions on surgeons’ training remains
a major unresolved issue for surgical trainees around the world.
In the context of this case and the potentially negative of lack of
training exposure, the thought of artificially restricting opera-
tive training exposure might be worth reconsidering.
A direct question also pertains to the selection process for
medical schools and residencies, which has heavily favored
scholastic and research accomplishments over personality,
technical skills, or humanistic qualities of candidates. In the
business world and many other realms such as the military,
validated personality inventory tests and psychometric testing
of candidates have become the norm, rather than the exception.
Interestingly, the dimension of the psychological make-up of
candidates has yet to find a formal role in the selection proce-
dures of the vast majority if not all medical training programs.
It is unclear how such insights may support specific qualities
that various subspecialties prefer for their respective missions,
but it stands to reason that borderline personality disorders,
personalities prone to addiction, and outright psychopathic
behaviors could be identified better and acted upon earlier
through routine application of psychometric testing. Improved
and continual performance reporting will hopefully allow
training programs in the future to separate swiftly from
underachieving trainees without the undeniably painful threat
of litigation.
From a performance perspective, the use of health care
quality data in adjudicating surgeons is challenging, as high
variability of patient disease severity, subspecialty idiosyncra-
sies, surgeon experience, and complex multifactorial care
environments amount to significant variables. A very proble-
matic issue is the attempt at drawing conclusions from low
number case counts. Small number variability is a known sta-
tistical phenomenon and uneducated observers can be prone
toward overreacting to such events. Especially spine, with its
substantial variability of care preferences, surgeon training and
resources as well as complexities of the patient pathologies is
very daunting field to adjudicate in a fair and above-board
fashion. Complications in complex spine surgery have been
reported to be common and in a well-performed prospective
study amounted to around 88%.8 These kinds of numbers may
make poor performance tracking very difficult. Unfortunately,
current common patient safety indicators are not sufficiently
specific to spine and can be heavily delayed in their outcomes
reporting. That said, simple indicators like mortality,
procedure-based length of stay, unplanned return to operating
room within 90 days, blood loss for routine procedures as well
as intensive care unit stays and sentinel events like infection,
paralysis and other easily identifiable major complications can
provide a helpful foundation for internal comparisons and
external benchmarking. To be effective, however, this data
needs to be gathered longitudinally and be regularly used by
the internal stakeholders. In case of questionable performance
such data should be openly shared with the concerned surgeon
and provide the foundation for an interactive performance
improvement opportunity and not be abused to suit nefarious
administrative or legal interests. Such “weaponization” of
objectively interpreted quality data has been a long-standing
concern of practitioners over the decades and has restricted the
desirable evolution of learning from complications as an essen-
tial element to benefit the overall progress of medicine. Hence
the value of the closed door “peer review” process has
remained a desirable tenant of medical quality review but is
based on the premise of a functioning internal peer review
process that is properly being utilized.
As surgeon recruitment is such a complex multifactorial
undertaking, a change in how we select practitioners might also
be worth considering. Currently, we frequently have to rely on
information gleaned from a set of rather standard menu of
candidates’ curricula vitae, letters of reference, interviews,
and—rarely—personal communications. Actual surgeon per-
formance is much harder to determine from such a system.
Instead, wouldn’t it be nice to see a surgeon candidate actually
operate in their current environment or at their potential future
job site? Current administrative burdens and regulatory restric-
tions make such ideas impractical. In light of the leap of faith it
currently takes to hire a new surgeon a practical exposure
opportunity would seem to be the most direct way to assess a
candidate’s actual performance. For medical systems it there-
fore would seem favorable to create pathways for temporary
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licensures and privileging to allow for greater first hand expo-
sure to candidate surgeons’ capabilities.
An essential touch point of the case of “Dr Death” was the
conflict of 3 large interest spheres surrounding review of
patient care. Specifically, where does the time-honored sanc-
tuary of “peer review” in patient care end, how far into this
entity should the power of the executive be allowed to reach,
and what all is included in the public’s “right to know?” The
sensationalist and sometimes blatantly politicized aspects of
the very successful “Dr Death” podcast underscore the dangers
of bringing complex medical and regulatory topics into the
public domain with the powers of manipulation inherently
available to near omnipresent public media platforms.9 It is
hard to see how the threat of public exposure and criminal
investigations would ever encourage surgeons to share their
complications more openly and for the ultimate public benefit.
Conversely, there has been a clear trend in most evolved soci-
eties toward demanding greater transparency and accountabil-
ity from any established organizational structure since World
War II. The failure of official medical boards to recognize and
pull “Black Swan” practitioners out of practice is not uncom-
monly discussed among subspecialty practitioners. A shocking
example of such failure can be seen in the story of Dr Michael
Swengo, a convicted serial killer of between 4 and 60 or more
patients in 5 US states and several African nations, as retold in
chilling detail by James B. Stewart in his nonfictional Edgar
Ward winning novel Blind Eye.10 A clear and ongoing problem
is the lack of transferability of confidential personnel files,
again a complex legal issue for which there is not a simple
answer. However, one of the solvable shortcomings of the
supervisory bodies as reported was the apparent absence of
knowledgeable and clinically active specialty clinicians and
patient care representatives on supervisory boards and commit-
tees with access to records from previous institutions. Instead,
it seems that at every level conflicted individuals without con-
tent knowledge put the interests of their respective organiza-
tions above that of their ultimate mission (to do the best for
each patient every time) and did not have access to or demand
to see previous concerns and records. Such detachment from
the core mission of patient care has created committees and
supervisory bodies with very limited content expertise and
direct clinical responsibilities. As to the field of spine surgery,
with all of its complexities, it can only help us and our patient
care mission to strive for better recognition as a subspecialty and
to seek representation and input in supervisory and administra-
tive leadership bodies to assure better patient care and adjudica-
tion in times of outlier management. For all too long, Spine has
been marginalized by their respective Orthopaedic and Neuro-
logical Surgery societal motherships and has not been able to
provide adequate input in difficult challenges such as defining
quality spine education and setting meaningful quality standards
while subsequently also addressing poor performers.
A further potential improvement to supervisory committees
or regulatory bodies could be the careful, and legally formally
framed, addition of a public representative in the form of a
“patient safety officer,” with an actual former patient represen-
tative serving as a “public eye” representative.
Hopefully concerted systems efforts brought forth from our
spine surgeon community, along with honest results and com-
plications reporting and increased emphasis on patient experi-
ences and outcomes, despite increasing adversarial exposure
pressures brought on by sensationalist media and trial attor-
neys, will help us regain the trust of the public and ultimately
allow the many benefits of spine care to receive the positive
attention it truly deserves.
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